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This essay celebrates the scholarly insight of Professors Lyman Johnson and David 
Millon into an essential component of contemporary corporate law and governance, beginning in 
2005 with their co-authored cornerstone article, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are 
Fiduciaries.”1 By emphasizing the salience of common law agency, Lyman and David recast the 
scholarly understanding of corporate officers into broader terms that enrich theoretical accounts 
of corporate governance while also reorienting theory closer to the law itself. Later publications 
by Lyman, several co-authored with Robert Ricca, made a case for the inaptness of the business 
judgment rule as applied to officers and addressed the importance of lawyers’ advice to officers 
about their fiduciary duties.2 In this essay, I examine further implications of Lyman and David’s 
*David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. For comments on an
earlier draft, I thank Elisabeth de Fontenay, Ofer Eldar, Andrew Gold, Lyman Johnson, and 
Emily Strauss. The essay benefited as well from discussions at the Symposium conference. 
1Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are 
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005). Preparing to write this essay, I found in my 
computer files a memo consisting of comments I sent to Lyman and David after they’d sent me a 
draft manuscript. The memo begins: “I think the basic point made in this paper is sound and that 
the paper ... fills a significant gap in the literature.” Memorandum (undated) from Deborah A. 
DeMott to Lyman Johnson and David Millon (copy on file with author). I’m grateful for a fitting 
occasion to celebrate the prescience of this body of scholarship. 
2Lyman P. Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 439 (2005); Lyman P. Q. Johnson & Robert Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate Officers 
About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663 (2007); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Having the 
Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model Advice for Corporate Officers (and other Senior Agents), 63 BUS. 
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fundamental insight, including developments in Delaware law that it foreshadowed. 
Although officers are crucial to explaining how corporations function, scholarly and 
theoretical accounts of corporate law and governance tend to slight officers’ positions as well as 
the distinctive quality of their duties. Following Johnson and Millon, this essay anchors 
corporate officers within the common law of agency, as does black-letter law. Making agency 
central to understanding officers’ positions and responsibilities helps to differentiate officers 
from directors. Like a director, an officer is a fiduciary, but distinctively so, not as a mere 
instance of a generic “corporate fiduciary” who owes duties of loyalty and care to the 
corporation. As this essay explains, officers’ duties of care are more particularized than a 
director’s general duty of care, consisting of distinct duties of care, competence, and diligence. 
Moreover, officers owe additional duties to the corporation: a duty to comply with a reasonable 
interpretation of lawful instructions received from the board or a superior officer, plus a duty to 
share material information with the board or others within the corporation.3 An officer’s decision 
whether to comply with these duties is not a judgment call for the officer, just as it is not for 
agents more generally. Officers’ distinct duties as agents are crucial to a corporation’s ability to 
exercise control over their actions.  
Venturing into more contested territory, the essay argues that when acting as agents—
representing a corporation in dealings with third parties or performing functions internal to the 
LAW. 147 (2007); Lyman P. Q. Johnson, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary 
Duties, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105 (2009); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on 
Officer Liability, 67 BUS. LAW. 75 (2011); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Dominance by inaction: 
Delaware’s long silence on corporate officers, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED: EVALUATING 
DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE IN CORPORATE LAW (Stephen Bainbridge ed. forthcoming 
2017)(Dominance). 
3For these duties, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.09 & 8.11. 
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corporation—officers should be subject to the same liability standard applicable to third-party 
agents who provide comparable services.4 Thus, an officer’s breach of her duties of care, 
competence, and diligence should be assessed against a standard of ordinary or simple 
negligence, as is the case for agents generally, not the less demanding standard of gross 
negligence applicable under Delaware law to directors’ breaches of their more generalized duty 
of care. Agency law focuses on whether an agent’s performance matched the expectations 
underlying the principal’s choice to be represented by a particular agent, a perspective that 
reflects the skills and knowledge that an agent possesses or claims to possess. Corporate officers, 
a cohort of agents situated internally within their principals, warrant no different treatment from 
externally-situated agents. To be sure, some corporate officers (especially ones very high in the 
hierarchy) occupy positions that require exercising, not specialized or technical expertise, but  
more generalized management skills. Membership in this senior managerial cohort does not 
displace the officer’s status as an agent.     
Additionally, to equate officers with directors for liability purposes undercuts directors’ 
right to rely on officers as well as the corporation’s ability to control its officer-agents, wherever 
situated within the corporation’s hierarchy. The equation of officers with directors also effaces 
some of the significance of the different roles occupied by directors in contrast with officers. 
And a board of directors might well wonder whether the corporation’s interests would be best 
served by supplementing its officers’ work with advice and other work product from third-party 
agents and advisors. But supplementing or supplanting work done by agents situated inside a 
4For an earlier comparative treatment of a few of these points, see Deborah A. DeMott, 
Inside the Corporate Veil: The Character and Consequences of Executives’ Duties, 19  
AUSTR. J. Corp. L. 251 (2006). 
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corporation with comparable services rendered by third-party agents may carry implications for 
efficiency.5 More generally, situating corporate officers within the ambit of agency relationships 
clarifies the contrast between legally-imposed (and relatively immutable) duties of loyalty and an 
agent’s duties of performance. Subject to some fundamental limits, a principal and an agent may 
define duties of performance through agreement, including the standard against which the 
agent’s performance will be assessed.   
Apart from the issues that engaged Lyman and David as scholars, this essay explores 
implications of a further feature distinguishing officers from directors, which is the relative 
fluidity in meaning associated with “officer.” Agency doctrine, by engaging the externally-
oriented consequences of an agency relationship as well as those that are inward-facing, provides 
an analytic framework that can be a source of insight. The essay concludes by identifying an 
implication for more general or theoretical accounts of fiduciary obligation Accounts of fiduciary 
obligation premised on the fiduciary’s possession of discretion clash with agency, centered as it 
is on the principal’s power to control the agent. Including agency within fiduciary taxonomy—as 
does the law—thus implies the need for a more inclusive definition.     
I. Officers and Their Duties
Contemporary corporation statutes articulate much about the functions directors serve
and the powers they hold. For example, the Delaware Corporation Law (DGCL) prescribes a 
function for directors, stating that the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed “by 
5Assessing these implications is beyond the scope of this Essay. On efficiency 
implications associated with transactional intermediaries situated externally to their clients, see 
Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 590 (2015).  
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or under” its board of directors.6 Other statutory prescriptions concern directors’ terms of office, 
committees of the board, shareholders’ power to remove directors, and much more.7 In contrast, 
the statute treats officers more briefly and less prescriptively. DGCL section 142 states that a 
corporation shall have “such officers with such titles and duties” as stated in the corporation’s 
bylaws or a resolution of the board not inconsistent with the bylaws, “and as may be necessary” 
to enable the corporation to sign instruments and stock certificates in compliance with other 
provisions in the statute.8 Section 142 mandates only one function to be served by an officer, 
which is recording “the proceedings of the stockholders and directors in a book to be kept for 
that purpose.”9 Section 142 also permits the same person to hold multiple offices unless the 
corporation’s certificate of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.10 Thus, the person 
charged with the secretarial function of recording proceedings could also serve as a Treasurer, a 
Chief Legal Officer, or a Vice-President.11 
Although the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) treats officers more extensively 
as a formal matter in five separate sections, as in the DGCL only the secretarial function is 
6Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
7Id. §§ 141(d)(directors’ terms of office); 141(c)(committees of board); 
141(k)(shareholders’ power to remove directors). 
8Id. § 142(a). 
9Id. § 142(a). 
10Id. § 142(a). 
11On the agency-law implications for apparent authority of particular offices and their 
titles, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03, cmt. e(5). For further discussion, see infra 
text accompanying notes 96-98. 
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prescribed.12 Additional MBCA provisions are noteworthy. First, the MBCA explicitly 
acknowledges that the rights and duties originating in appointment as an officer are not identical 
to those stemming from any contract between the officer and the corporation. Under section 
8.44, appointment as an officer does not itself create contract rights nor does an officer’s removal 
or resignation from office affect contract rights that the officer or the corporation may have 
against the other.13  In Section III, this essay elaborates further on relationships between 
contracting and an officer’s rights and duties. Second, MBCA section 1.40(8)—which has no 
DGCL counterpart—defines an officer (but not a director) as an employee of the corporation, 
regardless of other incidents of the relationship between the officer and the corporation.14 Only 
by accepting additional duties would a director also become an employee.  
 In Section III, this essay explores the implications of indeterminacy in the definition of 
“officer,” including those stemming from the practice of assigning “officer” titles to employees 
whose job functions are not executive or managerial. For present purposes, note that section 
1.40(8) constitutes a formal recognition of a potential distinction between directors and 
officers.15 More generally, as Johnson and Millon emphasize, scholarly discourse that 
                                                 
12MBCA § 8.40 (c)(bylaws or board of directors “shall assign to one of the officers 
responsibility for preparing the minutes of directors’ and shareholders’ meetings and for 
maintaining and authenticating” records of the corporation mandated by the statute). 
 
13Model Business Corporation Act § 8.44. 
14 MBCA § 1.40(8). 
15The wisdom of defining all officers to be employees has been questioned. See N.C. 
Gen. Stat., § 1.40, Amended North Carolina Commentary (iv)(deleting MBCA definition of 
“employee” as “unnecessary and undesirable.”). In Delaware, whether an officer is also an 
employee is likely a question of fact turning on the incidents of the officer’s relationship to the 
corporation. See Haft v. Dart Group Corp., 841 F. Supp. 549, 569-72 (D. Del. 1993). 
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amalgamates officers and directors into an undifferentiated category, “managers,” ignores critical 
differences in their respective roles (and duties).16 Also elided is the basic point that “officers are 
accountable to directors.”17 Directors act as or on behalf of the principal in a relationship with 
officers as the corporation’s agents.18          
 Legal implications of terminology aside for a moment, contemporary accounts of 
corporate governance conventionally assign functions and positions to persons designated as a 
corporation’s officers. For John Armour and Jeffrey Gordon, officers are “executives, tasked 
with making decisions about the running of the company.”19 Directors, in contrast, serve as 
monitors of officers’ performance, typically through board decisions on proposals that officers 
initiate, as well as by monitoring performance reporting and overseeing compensation structures 
and retention decisions for senior managers.20 Tasked with decisions about running the company, 
                                                 
16Johnson & Millon, supra note 1, at 1625. 
17Id. (emphasis in original). 
18Id. 
19John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 35, 65 (2014). An officer regarded as an “executive” in some contexts is not 
necessarily also an “executive officer” for purposes of the federal securities laws, defined as a 
corporation’s “president, any vice president...in charge of a principal business unit, division or 
function (such as sales, administration or finance), any officer who performs a policy making 
function or any other person who performs similar policy making functions ....” 17 C.F.R. § 
240.3b-7. Some requirements apply only to executive officers. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, Item 
402(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(3)(mandating disclosure in proxy statement of chief executive 
officer and four most highly compensated executive officers other than CEO).  
 
20Armour & Gordon, supra note 19, at 35. Likewise, for Robert Thompson, the primary 
role of directors is “monitoring managers,” who “are the key decision makers in corporate 
decisions, a point that reflects the influence of market and economic realities more than a 
command from law.” Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American 
Corporations, 71 BUS. LAW. 381, 404 (2016).  
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officers hold “power to initiate corporate decision-making.”21 All true, but centering the account 
of officers on their status as agents supplements inward-looking treatments of corporate 
governance by underlining the externally-oriented functions that officers serve. As its agents, 
officers represent the corporation in dealings with third parties, serve as high-level conduits 
through which the corporation learns facts about the world external to its own boundaries, and 
speak authoritatively on behalf of the corporation. For example, an officer’s power to initiate 
conduct attributable to a corporation encompasses conduct that is tortious.22     
 The background against which Johnson and Millon wrote in 2005 had little to say about 
the legally distinct position occupied by corporate officers. Emphasizing officers’ status as 
agents, by providing a “pre-existing set of expectations,” helps to flesh out officers’ duties in the 
absence of a “widely recognized conceptual grounding for the frequent doctrinal assertions that 
officers are fiduciaries.”23 Enhancing the absence, only rarely did judicial opinions need to 
articulate the basis for an officer’s duties to the corporation, distinct from those of directors.24  
                                                 
21Armour & Gordon, supra note 19, at 35. 
22For a recent example, see Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 2d 
1068, 1079 (9th Cir. 2016)(defendant’s CEO subject to personal liability, in addition to 
corporation’s liability; CEO initiated and directed promotional campaign that unlawfully 
accessed plaintiff’s website to send unsolicited and misleading emails to users of plaintiff’s 
social networking site). 
 
23Johnson & Millon, supra note 1, at 1636. As Lyman and David noted, officers’ status as 
agents was almost always treated as significant when the issue was their power to “affect the 
corporation’s relationship with third parties,” not the basis for their inward-looking duty to the 
corporation as principal. Id. at 1609.  
 
24Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 439 (2005)(Business judgment Rule); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, 
Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 865 (2005). In later writing, Lyman characterized this absence as a “silence.” See Johnson, 
Dominance, supra note 2, ms. at 3. Alternatively, Delaware law was not silent about officers’ 
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Post-2005 opinions from the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery answer a series 
of questions, inevitably leaving others unaddressed.  
 In Gantler v. Stephens, the Delaware Supreme Court in 2008 resolved a question of first 
impression, holding that corporate officers “owe fiduciary duties” and that those duties “are 
identical to those owed by corporate directors.”25 Gantler nicely illustrates the connection 
between officers’ externally-oriented status as agents and their internally-oriented fiduciary 
duties to the corporation. In Gantler, after a bank’s board decided it should be put up for sale and 
hired an external advisor for insight into strategic opportunities, the bank’s senior management 
resisted and instead urged that the bank be “privatized” via a share reclassification.26 But the 
board persisted with the sales process and eventually directed that its financial advisor and the 
corporation’s senior management conduct due diligence as requested by two potential 
purchasers. The two officers in charge did not furnish due diligence materials to one potential 
purchaser after promising to do so, leading the potential purchaser to withdraw its bid. The board 
remained uninformed until the bidder withdrew; management scheduled a due diligence session 
with the second bidder only after the first withdrew. Although the second bidder increased its 
offer price via an improved exchange ratio and the external advisor assessed the bid positively, 
the board rejected the offer and proceeded with the reclassification.  
                                                                                                                                                             
duties, just reliant on the common-law backdrop of agency, which rarely occupied the 
foreground.  
 
25Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del. 2008). A few lines on, Gantler 
characterizes officers’ fiduciary duties as “the same as those of directors.” Id. at 709. See also In 
re Dole Food Co. S’holder Litig., 2105 WL 5052214 at * 40 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015)(as an 
officer, corporation’s General Counsel owed “the same duties that he owed as a director”); for 
further discussion of Dole Foods, see infra n. 66. 
 
26965 A.2d  at 700. 
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 The Gantler court held that the facts alleged by the plaintiff were sufficient to establish 
disloyalty on the part of a majority of the corporation’s directors because they stood to benefit 
from the reclassification as shareholders in ways not available to other shareholders.27 
Additionally, on the facts alleged, the two officers breached their duties of loyalty by sabotaging 
their due diligence assignment. One officer—who also served as the board’s chair and the bank’s 
CEO—by breaching his duty of loyalty as a director would also breach “the same duty” as an 
officer.28 The second officer—the corporation’s Treasurer and Vice President who did not serve 
as a director—aided and abetted the CEO’s breach of loyalty.29 The Vice President/Treasurer, 
owing his job to the CEO, breached his duty of loyalty by assisting with the sabotage.30 Thus, the 
officers’ externally-directed actions (and instances of inaction) as the corporation’s 
representatives in due diligence with third parties breached the fiduciary duties they owed to the 
corporation itself. Given the facts alleged, the Gantler court lacked occasion to canvass the field 
of officers’ duties more extensively to consider whether those duties might extend beyond those 
“identical to” the duties of care and loyalty owed by directors. Gantler left open the possibility 
that defining officers’ duties required a binary choice between duties that replicate those of 
directors (and no more) versus the fuller suite of duties owed by agents.                
  The Court of Chancery addressed this latter point in 2015 in Amalgamated Bank v. 
                                                 
27Id. at 707. 
28Id. at 709. 
29On aiding and abetting another actor’s breach of fiduciary duty, see Deborah A. 
DeMott, Culpable Participation in Fiduciary Breach, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY 
LAW (Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon Smith, eds., forthcoming 2017).  
 
30Gantler, 965 A.2d at 709. 
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Yahoo! Inc., holding that officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors as “corporate 
fiduciaries” but additionally serve as “agents who report to the board of directors,” the 
corporation’s governing body.31 As agents, officers have a duty to comply with directives from 
the board as well as a duty “to provide the board of directors with the information that the 
directors need to perform their statutory and fiduciary roles.”32 On the facts alleged in Gantler, 
the two officer-defendants breached both agency-law duties; they failed to comply with the 
board’s directives by sabotaging the board-mandated due diligence process and they failed to 
provide information the board needed by not promptly informing it that a crucial component of 
the sale process had been frustrated, resulting in a bidder’s withdrawal. Overshadowing these 
breaches, though, are the officers’ evident breaches of their duties of loyalty.  
 In Amalgamated Bank, in contrast, what motivated the officer’s actions remains open for 
further factual exploration. A stockholder demanded—and the court granted—inspection into the 
corporation’s books and records concerning the hiring and firing fourteen month later of a senior 
executive, the corporation’s chief operating officer (COO). Under the terms of his employment 
agreement, the COO’s firing without cause triggered a $60 million severance payout.33 On the 
facts alleged in the stockholder’s demand for inspection, the court found “a credible basis to 
suspect possible breaches of fiduciary duty” by the corporation’s CEO who led the hiring 
process, took actions that materially increased the COO’s potential compensation, and decided to 
                                                 
31132 A.3d 752, 780 (Del. Ch. 2016).  
32Id. at 781. 
33More precisely, a payout of $59.96 million. See id. at 773.  
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terminate the COO’s employment without cause.34 Allegedly, the CEO “cryptically” withheld 
the prospective COO’s name from the relevant board committee early in the hiring process while 
seeking its approval for a large compensation package and then provided inaccurate information 
about the terms of the initial offer to the COO, while asking the committee to approve a change 
that doubled the offer’s payout from options and incentive stock units.35 And the CEO made 
changes to the final offer letter to the COO that the board committee had not authorized and did 
not inform the committee about the changes.36 In the court’s assessment, why the CEO did these 
things is relevant to whether they constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.37 Articulating a range of 
potential motivations, Amalgamated Bank begins with “innocent mistake,” one potentially  
inconsequential; then negligence in some degree; then an improper motive, perhaps tied to the 
fact that the CEO and COO shared the same former employer.38 But the opinion cautions the 
court draws no inference that the COO acted intentionally to withhold information or to lie to the 
board.  
Amalgamated Bank illustrates the significance of identifying agency law as a source of 
officers’ duties. Showing that an officer breached a duty grounded in agency law does not 
require showing that the officer, additionally, breached a duty of loyalty, as did the two officers 
in Gantler. Thus, an officer would breach duties owed as an agent by deliberately failing to 
34Id. at 782. 
35Id. at 782. 
36Id. 
37Id.. 
38For discussion of motivations for action that may breach the good faith component of 
an officer’s duty of loyalty, see infra text accompanying notes 75-78. 
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comply with a board directive although the officer acted in the belief that the officer knew better 
than the board what to do but did not otherwise act to further the officer’s own interests.39 
Applying plain-vanilla agency doctrine, by disregarding the board’s directive, the CEO exceeded 
the scope of the actual authority conferred by the corporation as principal. So to act subjects the 
officer—like any agent—to liability to indemnify the principal for any loss it suffers.40 In the 
terminology of an earlier era in agency law, the officer breached a duty of “service and 
obedience.”41 Indeed, an agent is not spared liability for an unauthorized act when the act results 
from the agent’s misinterpretation of an unambiguous instruction received from the principal.42 
When the agent’s misinterpretation is negligent, the agent has fallen short of fulfilling duties of 
care, competence, and diligence,43 which does not excuse the agent’s departure from the duty to 
follow the principal’s instructions. More generally, like an agent’s duty to provide material 
information to the principal, the duty to comply with instructions is an integral component of the 
principal’s ability to exercise control over its agents. Agents who disregard the principal’s 
instructions or withhold material information from the principal undermine its legitimate powers 
                                                 
39For further discussion of agents’ duties in interpreting and following instructions, see 
Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of Instructions, 
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 321 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, 
eds. 2014)(Fiduciary Character). 
 
40RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09, cmt. b. 
41RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 383. This section states one of a series of duties 
within a title “Duties of Service and Obedience.” 
 
42Id. cmt. b; accord, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 cmt. c. 
43RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08. 
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of control.44  
 These implications underscore the significance of officers’ status as agents, as well as the 
distinctiveness of agency as a body of law. Corporate law itself includes no separate duty of 
obedience; as Megan Wischmeier Shaner terms it, the duty is “peculiar to agency law.”45 The 
duty is integral to the principal’s right to control its agents, itself a defining feature of an agency 
relationship.46 How broadly or narrowly to formulate instructions is the principal’s choice. In the 
corporate context the board determines, as it finds appropriate under the circumstances, the 
extent to which its directives confer discretion on senior officers.47 The board may confer broad 
discretion on senior officers, communicating general corporate goals or objectives but leaving 
questions of implementation and execution to the officers’ discretion.48 But a board may also 
furnish tightly or narrowly drawn instructions.49 Additionally, the board’s ability to furnish 
instructions to officers trumps contractual provisions that define an officer’s position. By 
providing such instructions, the board—reacting perhaps to new circumstances or its 
                                                 
44On the relationship between the principal’s control over agents and their duties to 
interpret and comply with instructions received from the principal, see id. § 1.01, cmt. e; 
DeMott, Fiduciary Character, supra note 39, at 325-26. 
 
45Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate 
Management: Enforcing an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 66 BUS. LAW. 28, 44-45 (2010). 
 
46Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013). 
47Shaner, supra note 45, at 49-50. 
48Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on Officer Liability, 67 BUS. LAW. 
75, 90 (2011)(Reality Check).  
 
49Although it’s likely true that only rarely does the duty of obedience have much bite as 
against officers, id. at 89, Gantler and Amalgamated Bank illustrate the significance of the basic 
duty.  
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reassessment of an ongoing situation—may cause the corporation to breach its employment 
agreement with the officer, but the officer’s duty as an agent still requires compliance with 
lawful instructions.50 The board’s right to provide binding instructions creates a flexible capacity 
to respond to changed circumstances without renegotiating (and repricing) an officer’s 
employment agreement.51    
 Finally, although corporate law itself does not create a separate duty to comply with 
instructions, a parallel doctrine constrains directors’ discretion to depart from limits imposed by 
shareholders in approving stock-option and other compensation plans. For example, when 
directors make an award of shares in excess of a numerical limit set in a stockholder-approved 
plan, the business judgment rule does not insulate the directors’ decision from judicial scrutiny 
into its merits.52 Likewise, directors lack discretion to back-date an award of stock options 
without authorization in a stockholder-approved plan.53 But these outcomes do not turn on 
applying a distinctively corporate-law doctrine such as waste. They might be characterized as sui 
generis or as a  “peculiar subset” of cases.54 Alternatively, although directors are not agents 
within the common-law definition,55 directors, like officers and other agents, act subject to 
                                                 
50RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01 cmt. f(1); 8.09(2) 
51Shaner, supra note 45, at 49-50. 
52Sanders v. Wang, 1999 WL 1044880 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 1999). 
53Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
54Landy v. D’Alessandro, 316 F. Supp. 2d 49, 69 (D. Mass 1997)(characterizing Sanders 
as within “a peculiar subset of that case law where the violation of a contract is so clear that the 
violation alone creates a reasonable doubt that the board acted in good faith and honest belief.”). 
 
55RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. f(2). 
  
-16- 
constraints that define the outer bounds of action that is rightful or authorized.56  The rationale 
for this “peculiar subset,” in other words, consists of limits on directors’ authority bearing a 
family resemblance to constraints imposed by agency law.  
         
II.  Liability Frameworks and Standards 
 As the Court of Chancery noted in Amalgamated Bank, distinct from the content of 
officers’ duties, a “vibrant debate” focuses on the framework for assessing an officer’s liability 
stemming from a breach of duty.57 When a director allegedly breaches a duty, the analytic 
framework deployed by corporate law does not conflate the standard of conduct, which specifies 
whether the director breached the duty, with the standard of review through which a court 
determines whether the director should be subject to liability.58 In contrast, agency law conflates 
these questions, as do other bodies of law, including tort law.59 Additionally, when an agent 
causes loss to the principal by breaching the agent’s duties of care, competence, or diligence, the 
agent is subject to liability to the principal for simple negligence.60 But Delaware gears directors’ 
                                                 
56In the absence of such bounds, directors who benefit personally from decisions they 
make run the risk of losing the protection of the business judgment rule. See Seinfeld v. Slager, 
2012 WL 2501105 at 10-11 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012)(directors’ self-award of units under 
stockholder-approved restricted stock unit plan fell outside business judgment rule; terms of plan 
were insufficiently defined to constitute a meaningful limit on board).  
 
57Amalgamated Bank, 132 A.3d at 780-81 n. 24. 
58Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of 
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). 
 
59Id. at 437. 
60RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08; Amalgamated Bank, 132 A.3d at 780-81. 
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liability for breaches of the duty of care to the more demanding standard of gross negligence.61 
Separately, claims against directors are assessed with a deferential standard of review, the 
business judgment rule, which lacks a counterpart in agency law.62 The business judgment rule 
consists of a presumption that in making a business judgment directors “acted on an informed 
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”63 Shareholders rebut the presumption by alleging facts that support a reasonable 
inference that a director breached either her duty of care (measured against a gross negligence 
standard) or her duty of loyalty.64 Finally, like most all other states, Delaware permits a 
corporation to adopt a charter provision exculpating directors—but not  officers—against 
monetary liability resulting from breaches of the duty of care.65  As a consequence, when an 
                                                 
61Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 & n. 6 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds 
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)(characterizing standard as “less exacting” than 
simple negligence). Within tort law, “gross negligence” is defined through contrasts with other 
forms of culpable conduct, constituting wrongdoing in an aggravated form that falls short of an 
intentional tort and of reckless conduct but is “negligence that is especially bad.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 2, cmt. a. 
 
62Amalgamated Bank, 132 A.3d at 780-81 n.24. 
63Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)(internal citations omitted). 
64Gantler, 965 A.2d at 706. 
65Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). A few states authorize charter provisions that 
exculpate officers, as well as directors, from monetary liability. See Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo 
Magnolfi, Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law (working paper 2016) 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2685969(mentioning Maryland and Nevada). See Md. 
Corps & Assn’s § 2-405.2; Nev. Stat. Ann. § 78.138 (7). Additionally, under Nevada law, unless 
a corporation’s certificate of incorporation otherwise provides (and subject to a few explicit 
statutory exceptions), an officer is not subject to liability to the corporation, its shareholders, or 
its creditors on the basis that the officer breached any fiduciary duty, including the duty of 
loyalty, in the absence of fraud, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law. Nev. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 78.138(7). 
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officer also serves as a director, the capacity in which the officer took the actions that underlie 
the claim determines the availability of exculpation.66      
 The vibrancy of the debate surrounding officers’ liability owes much to the absence of 
definitive resolution from Delaware courts themselves. As the federal district court for Delaware  
noted in a recent bankruptcy case, the defendants cited no cases from Delaware courts holding 
that the business judgment rule applies to officers.67 In In re Tower Air, Inc., an earlier 
bankruptcy case, the Third Circuit assumed without discussion that the business judgment rule 
applies to officers as well as directors.68 Given the centrality of Delaware courts to corporate 
litigation, this absence is itself open to competing explanations.69 One is the greater likelihood 
                                                 
66See In re Dole Foods, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214 at *40 (Del. Ch., Aug. 27, 
2015)(corporation’s General Counsel, who also served as a director, “primarily interacted...as an 
officer” with board committee created when corporation’s Chairman and CEO (also its 
controlling shareholder) proposed transaction to acquire all stock he did not own, with the 
consequence that General Counsel was not protected by exculpatory clause; as a director, 
General Counsel committed acts not in good faith and breached his duty of loyalty). 
 
67Palmer v. Reali, __ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2016 WL 5662008 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016). The 
same was true eleven years earlier. See Johnson, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 24, at 440 
(noting in 2005 that Delaware “has yet to hold squarely that the [business judgment] rule applies 
to officers as well as directors.”). 
 
68In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005). Tower Air holds that the 
plaintiff overcame the business judgment presumption as applied to officers through allegations 
that the company’s officers “did nothing” in the face of negative reports concerning aircraft 
maintenance, failed to process used airline tickets worth a million dollars. See 416 F.3d at 239-
41. 
 
69One potential explanation was the historical difficulty of securing personal jurisdiction 
in a Delaware court over a non-resident officer, as opposed to a director. This potential obstacle 
was eliminated in 2004 through a statutory amendment that deems a person who accepts election 
or appointment as an officer of a Delaware corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction in suits 
brought in Delaware courts. Del. Code Ann., tit. 10, § 3114. See Johnson, Business Judgment 
Rule, supra note 24, at 440 (noting that “prominent judges” in Delaware expected litigation 
newly focused on officers following the statutory amendment). Whether implied-consent statutes 
like Delaware’s comport with constitutional limits on the assertion of personal jurisdiction has 
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that claims against officers would be asserted by bankruptcy trustees or receivers than by 
corporate directors, plus the hurdles that shareholders confront as plaintiffs in litigation against 
non-director defendants.70 And, like other principals, directors may have a rational preference to 
discharge or otherwise settle up with wrongdoing agents, in this instance officers.71 Separately, 
an allegation that a director breached a duty of performance may require more investigation into 
contextual specifics than would duty-of-loyalty claims, making duty-of-performance claims 
more vulnerable to motions to dismiss.     
 While acknowledging that much remains open to debate, I focus first on the application 
of the business judgment rule to officers and then turn to the substantive standard applicable to 
conduct by officers that breaches either a generally-formulated duty of care or a component of 
the agency law duties of care, competence, and diligence.72 As noted above, the presumptions 
created by the business judgment rule do not apply when the plaintiff alleges facts that support a 
reasonable inference that in making a business decision, the actor in question breached either the 
duty of care or the duty of loyalty.73 Delaware cases define the duty of loyalty as inclusive of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
been questioned. See Verity Winship, Jurisdiction Over Corporate Officers and the Incoherence 
of Implied Consent, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1171.   
 
70See Johnson & Ricca, Reality Check, supra note 48, at 88. 
71Id. at 87-88(discussing range of potential intra-corporate sanctions). 
72RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08. 
73 A shareholder’s complaint cannot survive a motion to dismiss by a director protected 
by an exculpatory provision when the complaint alleges only the underlying transaction would 
be subject to the entire fairness standard of review. See Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., S’holder 
Litig., 115 A.3d 1173 (Del. 2015). 
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duty to act in good faith.74 A failure to act in good faith results when a fiduciary “intentionally 
acts with a purpose other than advancing the best interests of the corporation ....”75 A fiduciary 
also fails to act in good faith by acting “with the intent to violate applicable positive law ....”76 
Additionally and perhaps more broadly, “intentionally fail[ing] to act in the face of a known duty 
to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties” is an instance of a failure to act in 
good faith.77  
 If applied to officers, the business judgment rule should have comparable limitations, 
making its protection unavailable when the facts support a reasonable inference of a breach of 
the  duty of loyalty or the duties of care, competence, and diligence. The good-faith component 
of the duty of loyalty would deny protection to an officer who acted with the requisite 
knowledge, intention, or scienter for a proscribed purpose or in violation of positive law. More 
open to debate is conduct by an officer who consciously disregards a directive received from the 
board or withholds material information from the board or a board committee. Would an 
                                                 
74Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
75In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 
76Id. For a recent application of this definition, see In re Duke Energy Corp. Derivative 
Litig., 2016 WL 4543788 at 16-17 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2016)(complaint alleged directors violated 
state law by knowingly or willfully providing false information to utility commission concerning 
identity of corporation’s CEO following merger that required permission from commission). 
 
77Disney, 907 A.2d at 755. The instances stated in Disney expressly do not exhaust the 
possible forms that failure to act in good faith may take, only the “most salient” three. Id. at 756. 
Another identified by the court arises when disinterested directors, aware of all the facts 
concerning a colleague’s self-dealing transaction (including the colleague’s conflict of interest), 
approve the transaction “to reward a colleague rather than for the benefit of the shareholders.” Id. 
at 756 n. 464. Delaware’s statutory safe harbor for transactions in which a director has a 
conflicting interest requires that the directors who approve the transaction act in good faith. Del. 
Code Ann., tit. 8, § 144(a)(3).     
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officer’s breach of a distinctively agency-law duty constitute conduct not in good faith, and thus 
breach the officer’s duty of loyalty? Or are these duties, like the duty of good faith, themselves 
components of the duty of loyalty?78  
 More generally, it’s hard to see any justification for characterizing an officer’s deliberate 
disregard of agency-law duties as an exercise of “business judgment.” Like any agent, an officer 
lacks discretion to ignore unambiguous directives received from the principal, even when the 
officer disagrees with them, just as junior or subordinate officers or employees have a duty to 
comply with lawful instructions received from personnel higher in an organization’s hierarchy. 
Indeed, the most prominent defenders of applying the business judgment rule to officers 
acknowledge that its application should not extend to conduct “outside the scope of [officers’] 
delegated authority,”79 a concept delimited by officers’ distinctive duties as agents. Put 
differently, as an agent an officer does not have a right unilaterally to redefine the scope of her 
authority.    
 That officers are agents is more significant when focus shifts to the substantive standard 
applicable to breaches of duties of care, competence, and diligence. As noted above, directors’ 
alleged breaches of the duty of care are assessed against a liability standard of gross negligence, 
not the simple (or ordinary) negligence standard applicable to agents. But note that directors’ and 
officers’ duties differ in their relative generality (“care”) or specificity (“care, competence, and 
diligence”). This difference is tied to the fact that officers, like other agents, are chosen on the 
basis of the skills and knowledge that they possess (or claim to possess), which range from 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
78For these possibilities, see Shaner, supra note 45, at 49. 
79Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 24, at 866. 
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highly specialized to very general. Additionally, when courts evaluate whether directors 
breached duties of care, the focus is the process used, not the quality of the decision itself or, for 
that matter, of the decision-makers themselves.  
 In contrast, agency law focuses on discrepancies between agents’ performance and the 
expectations underlying a principal’s choice to be represented by a particular agent. Why apply a 
less demanding standard—gross negligence—to corporate officers as a particular cohort of 
agents? Applying a gross negligence standard is especially inapt when the officer in question 
performs functions as a member of a profession or particular discipline when comparable 
services are available from practitioners who are situated externally to the corporation. For 
example, why should malpractice on the part of a chief legal officer be assessed against a 
standard of gross negligence, as opposed to the ordinary negligence regime applicable to 
departures from the standard of care by other lawyers who represent the corporation?80 Along 
these lines, information internal to the corporation is more accessible (or more immediately) 
accessible to officers than to non-officer directors, which limits officers’ right to rely on 
information furnished by others.81 Just as directors and shareholders might reasonably expect an 
officer to have relevant on-the-ground knowledge about the corporation’s affairs,82 so they might 
                                                 
80 For the standard of care generally applicable to lawyers, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52. 
 
81A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-
Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 218 (1992)(discussing MBCA § 8.42, official 
cmt.).   
 
82Directors’ reasonable expectation that officers have such knowledge is linked to 
officers’ duties as agents to share relevant information with the board. See supra text 
accompanying notes 3 & 44. The duty includes the duty to report information received from 
personnel lower in the organizational hierarchy. For a troubling example, characterized by the 
court as an instance of bad faith, see Tower Air, 416 F.3d at 239 (airline’s officers “did nothing” 
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reasonably expect performance in office that’s consistent with the assumed skill set and capacity 
for diligence and care that constituted the premise for hiring that particular officer.83 Thus, 
directors (and others) who rely on officers to prepare financial forecasts and present them to the 
board would reasonably expect preparation consistent with methodologies and standards used by 
reasonable persons performing comparable work,84 just as directors who rely on officers who 
profess to have expertise as managers that is more generalized should reasonably expect 
performance consistent with that of comparators acting as reasonable persons.85   
 To be sure, unlike directors, in most jurisdictions officers do not have the benefit of 
provisions in corporate charters exculpating against monetary liability stemming from breaches 
of duties of care, whether stemming from gross or ordinary negligence.86 Agency law 
acknowledges the possibility of contractual solutions by embracing a role for agreements 
                                                                                                                                                             
when told by Director of Safety of quality-assurance problems with aircraft maintenance and 
failures to record maintenance and repair work). 
 
83Relatedly, when an agent claims to possess special skills or knowledge, the agent’s 
duties of performance are geared to a standard consistent with possessing such skills or 
knowledge. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08.   
 
84Palmer, __ F. Supp. 3d at __ (financial forecasts prepared by president and chief 
financial officer departed from established methodology by comparing corporation with 
companies experiencing increased revenue, not comparators—like corporation—with declining 
revenue).  
 
85Assuring the robustness of directors’ right to rely on officers is consistent with 
perceiving the law on corporate officers as “just one more aspect of Delaware’s law on directors. 
Johnson, Dominance, supra note 2, at ms. p. 15 (emphasis omitted)(characterizing corporate 
management and overall welfare as “manifestly officer-centric” in contrast with corporate 
governance, which is “decidedly director-centric”).  
  
86See supra text accompanying note 65. 
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between principals and agents that define in advance the applicable standard of performance.87 
This enables an officer to negotiate for specificity in what will be expected, while also enabling 
the board to price the value of what it anticipates receiving in exchange from the officer.88              
 Corporate law itself embraces a central feature of the agency law framework by robustly 
protecting directors’ right to rely on officers. As formulated by statute in Delaware, a member of 
a board of directors has the a right to rely in good faith on “information, opinions, reports, or 
statements” presented by officers “or by any other person as to matters the member reasonably 
believes are within that person’s professional or expert competence and who has been selected 
with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.”89 A cautious director might be reluctant 
to rely on an officer’s opinions or reports prepared by the officer or under her supervision, 
knowing that the officer—unlike externally-situated sources of expertise—need worry only 
about slippages that can be characterized as grossly negligent. In response, cautious directors 
might seek more input from externally-situated agents. A countervailing risk is that the prospect 
of greater liability risks for officers relative to directors would encourage officers to shift more 
responsibility to the board.90 But the risk of responsibility-shifting, if identified in advance, can 
                                                 
87RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08, cmt. b. 
88 This long-standing dimension of agency law contrasts with the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s characterization of fiduciary duties as “immutable.” See Mills Acq. Co. v. MacMillan, 
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989). However, read in context, this statement in Mills is 
limited to the duty of loyalty. 
 
89Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 141(e). 
90Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 24, at 875. See also Sparks & Hamermesh, supra 
note 81, at 237 (depriving officers of protection of business judgment rule represents surrender 
by corporation of “part of its freedom from judicial scrutiny” in decisions made by directors to 
delegate responsibility to officers). 
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be priced into the terms of the corporation’s relationship with its officers. 
 As discussed above, agency law’s framework enables an officer worried about liability 
risks under a regime of simple negligence to negotiate terms that specify a standard for 
performance. In structuring the terms under which the corporation engages an officer or any 
other agent, the board has flexibility subject to broad constraints mostly developed in cases 
involving lop-sided outcomes from arrangements for executive compensation. Agency creates a 
framework through which an officer’s concerns about liability can be specified in advance and 
addressed through an agreement. The parties’s flexibility, although extensive, is not infinite. In 
retaining an advisor, the terms to which the board agrees are ineffectual if they permit the 
advisor to act contrary to the board’s interests as the advisee, undermining the advice on which 
the advisor knows the board will rely.91 The same fundamental limit should also apply as well to 
the terms under which a corporation, acting through its directors, agrees to employ an officer, 
recognizing as it does that duties are inherent to some roles.92 
 
III.  “Officer” as a Fluid Category 
 Although not a focus of Johnson and Millon’s scholarship, the definitional fluidity of 
“officer” as a category is itself intriguing.93 How “officer” is defined varies, depending on the 
                                                 
91RBC Capital Mkts. LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 865 n. 191 (Del. 2015). 
92For this terminology, see Numeric Analysis, LLC v. McCabe, 161 F. Shpp. 3d 348, 358 
(E.D. Pa. 2016)(fiduciary duty of LLC’s President was “inherent to the role” she played as 
officer of entity formed and headquartered in Pennsylvania; as a consequence, district court in 
Pennsylvania had specific personal jurisdiction over President for purposes of breach of fiduciary 
duty and duty of loyalty claims).  
 
93See Winship, supra note 69, at 1195. 
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jurisdiction and the question. In Verity Winship’s account, “‘officer’ means one thing for 
personal jurisdiction, another for securities disclosure rules, and who-knows-what for triggering 
state-law fiduciary duties.”94 In contrast, as noted in Section I, the position occupied by a board 
of directors is defined by the applicable corporation statute. Numerous cases that flesh out the 
specifics of directors’ status, rights, and responsibilities stabilize the meaning of “director” as a 
category. Most of the time, though, in connection with corporate governance the meaning of 
“officer” conforms to the prescriptive definition stated by Gilchrist Sparks and Lawrence 
Hamermesh: a person entrusted with “administrative and executive functions” but not persons 
who lack “judgment or discretion as to corporate matters.”95 
 Focusing on the status of corporate officers as agents illustrates that definitional fluidity 
can carry consequences. Consider first an officer’s externally-oriented role as an agent. By 
assigning a title that’s conventionally held by an officer, the corporation runs the risk of creating 
apparent authority in the title-holder to do acts conventionally associated with an officer holding 
a like title.96 For example, the apparent authority of a corporation’s CEO encompasses 
transactions within the ordinary course of the corporation’s business although the board has 
restricted the CEO’s actual authority unbeknownst to third parties.97 Likewise, by entitling an 
                                                 
94Id. at 1195-96. 
95Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 81, at 216. 
96RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03, cmt. e.  
97Id. § 3.03, cmt. e(3). Numerous precedents define an officer’s apparent authority to 
engage in actions comprising a corporation’s ordinary business. For a potential regulatory 
implication, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule 14A-8’s Ordinary Business 
Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement By Proposal, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 705, 
738-40 (2016)(urging SEC’s staff to turn to apparent-authority precedents to assess whether 
shareholder proposal may be omitted from proxy statement because it concerns a matter of 
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employee “CEO,” the corporation as principal may create an appearance of authority on which 
third parties have a right to rely when their belief in the reality of authority is reasonable. Agency 
doctrine in this respect is analogous to the partnership-law doctrine of partnership by estoppel, 
which protects third parties who enter into transactions on the basis of a representation that a 
person is a partner.98 Agency law thus responds to definitional fluidity by turning to conventional 
usage and meaning associated with particular titles and positions, keyed to the doctrine of 
apparent authority.  
 Now consider an internally-oriented perspective on the term “officer” and its potential 
consequences. For its own purposes, a corporation may assign an officer’s title to an employee, 
either as an honorific reward or to enable the employee to perform specified tasks on the 
corporation’s behalf, despite the fact that the employee’s job duties entail no executive or 
supervisory functions. This practice is compatible with the non-prescriptive treatment of the 
“officer” category in corporation statutes. To an employee, being named an “officer” may appear 
to be internally meaningful and to confer rights as against the corporation. Corporation statutes 
in Delaware and other states permit a corporation to bind itself to indemnify its directors and 
officers, whether present or former, against expenses incurred in connection with litigation 
related to their corporate positions, subject to limitations not relevant for purposes of this 
Essay.99 Likewise, a corporation may bind itself to advance litigation expenses incurred by a 
                                                                                                                                                             
corporation’s ordinary business). 
 
98Unif. Partnership Act § 308(b). Many thanks to Andrew Gold who alerted me to this 
analogy. 
 
99Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 145(f). 
  
-28- 
director or officer,100 and may extend advancement rights to employees and other agents through 
contract. One conventional route to create such rights is through a bylaw provision stating that 
“officers” and “directors” shall, to the extent permitted by law, receive advancements and be 
indemnified. A set of bylaws might go further in the direction of specificity by defining the 
meaning of “officer” for this purpose by listing categories of eligible persons by title.  
 In Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., the defendant’s bylaws designated “vice 
presidents” as “officers” entitled to indemnification and advancement, whether incumbent or  
former occupants of an office.101 But the defendant resisted the plaintiff’s demand for 
advancement in connection with the expenses of a then-ongoing state prosecution. The plaintiff 
had copied computer files and transferred them out of the defendant’s organization to a 
competitor of the defendant’s when he joined it as an employee. The defendant also resisted the 
plaintiff’s demand for indemnification based on his successful defense of an earlier federal 
prosecution involving the same conduct.102 A majority of a Third Circuit panel, applying 
Delaware law, held that the bylaw’s use of “officer” was ambiguous and permitted the defendant 
to introduce extrinsic evidence of trade usage acknowledging the prevalence of “title inflation” 
in the financial services industry.103 The plaintiff’s work consisted of computer programming; 
his success led to his designation as a “vice president” in the defendant’s equities division but not 
to responsibilities to supervise other employees or transact business with third parties on behalf 
                                                 
100Id. § 145 (e)-(f). 
101Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014). 
102Id. at 353. 
103Id. at 364-65. 
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of the defendant. The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s order granting summary judgment 
to the plaintiff on the advancement question, remanding for further proceedings.104 In dissent, 
one member of the panel argued that under Delaware law the doctrine of contra proferentum 
should apply to resolve against the defendant any arguable ambiguity. The defendant acted 
unilaterally in drafting its bylaws and should be incentivized to clarify them.105  
 Issues of ambiguity aside, it’s understandable that the defendant in Aleynikov might not 
wish to fund the plaintiff’s ongoing defense given the underlying premise of the prosecution. But 
the defendant did not revise the terms applicable to the plaintiff’s association with it, including 
rights to advancement, as might be done by contract through an employment separation 
agreement.106 The majority’s analysis enables the defendant to have the benefit of discretion to 
be exercised when an “officer” seeks advancement but without either taking prior unilateral 
action to clarify the bylaw or restrict its coverage, or entering into an individualized contract with 
the “officer” providing such discretion to the corporation.  
 Additionally, the Third Circuit’s resolution is at odds with the externally-oriented 
dimension of agency law discussed above. A robust doctrine, apparent authority attaches 
consequences to placing agents in defined positions or assigning titles conventionally associated 
with actual authority of a particular scope. True, the office of “vice president” may not carry 
                                                 
104Id. at 368. The district court had earlier denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment on his claim for indemnification. Id. at 353. 
 
105Id. at 370. 
106For an example, see Flood v. Clearone Commc’ns, Inc. 618 F.3d 1110 (10th Cir. 
2010)(terms of former CEO’s separation agreement conditioned advancement on determination 
that the best interests of the company at the time of determination necessitated using funds to 
make advancement). In Flood, the company’s CEO was convicted on securities fraud charges 
originating in an SEC investigation that began while the CEO was still employed.  
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actual or apparent authority to bind the corporation in the absence of a functional specification of 
responsibilities, for which the particular vice president would have a customary level of authority 
over the specified functional area (such as “sales”).107 In Aleynikov, the vice president’s title did 
not include a functional designation, which undercuts the prospect that he could act with 
apparent authority in dealings with third parties on behalf of the defendant. And unlike many 
vice presidents within banks, his job duties did not require signing documents on behalf of the 
defendant.108  But internally, the defendant’s own bylaws defined a “vice president” as an 
“officer” and explicitly assigned consequences to holding an officer’s position. The defendant, 
that is, made a manifestation to its “officers” through its bylaws about the consequences of 
membership in that category, constituting an instance of internally-oriented conduct that 
expresses meaning to persons who, not advised otherwise, may rely on its explicit terms.109    
 A final issue is whether a defendant’s victory over its former officer in an advancement 
claim might otherwise operate to undercut the defendant’s position. In Aleynikov, the defendant 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
107RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03, cmt. (e)(4). 
108See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., C.A. No. 10636-VCL, July 13, 2016, 
slip op. at 8-9 (Post-Trial Order and Final Judgment), available at 
www.delawarelitigation.com/files/2016/07/AdvanAlexnCaseFinal-Order-and-Judgment2.pdf, 
aff’d, __ A. 3d __ (Del. 2017). 
  
109An allied principle requires that an employer act prospectively and give notice to 
affected employees when it modifies or revokes a prior binding promise or policy statement 
concerning compensation. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.04 (2015). Also, when a 
dispute involves multiple sources for indemnification and advancement, Delaware law requires 
that they be read distinctively, not conjunctively, as independent sources of rights. See 
Narayanan v. Sutherland Global Holdings, 2016 WL 3682617 (Del. Ch. July 5, 2016). Thus, a 
condition on advancement rights imposed in a bylaw is inapplicable to advancement rights 
created by a contract that omits the condition unless the corporation demonstrates that the two 
instruments were intended to operate conjunctively.  
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brought counterclaims against its former officer. Bound by the issue preclusion stemming from 
the earlier Third Circuit ruling, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the former officer was 
not entitled to advancement in connection with his defense of the counterclaims (but also 
suggested that the Third Circuit may have misunderstood Delaware law).110 If, as is typical in 
post-employment disputes, a defendant’s counterclaims allege breach of fiduciary duty, would 
the defendant undermine the premise of fiduciary counterclaims by persuading an earlier court 
that the employee was not an officer? As Professor Winship noted, what “officer” means may be 
“who-knows-what for triggering state-law fiduciary duties.”111 The common law of agency treats 
all employees regardless of status or job duties as agents, who by definition owe fiduciary duties 
to the principal.112 In some states, however, the “fiduciary” label is confined to employees in 
positions of trust and confidence with the employer; other employees may be subject to more 
limited duties of loyalty.113 Thus, dislodging a now-former employee from the “officer” category 
can risk vaulting the employer into the terrain of “who-knows-what,” depending on the substance 
of the conduct at issue in the counterclaim and the textured specifics of the corporation’s 
relationship with its now-former employee.     
110See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., C.A. No. 10636-VCL, July 13, 2016 
(Post-Trial Order and Final Judgment). 
111Winship, supra note 69, at 1195-96. 
112RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. c. & § 8.01, cmt. b. Agency law 
recognizes that “fiduciary obligation is not monolithic in now it operates,” id. § 8.01, cmt. c, and 
that its scope and demands turn on specifics of an agent’s position.  
113RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01. An employee, whether or not in a 
position of trust and confidence with the employer, breaches a duty of loyalty by 
misappropriating the employer’s property, whether tangible or intangible. Id. § 8.01(b)(3). 
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IV. Implications for Fiduciary Theory
Focusing on the status of corporate officers as agents has implications for more general or
theoretical accounts of fiduciary law because it sharpens appreciation of the distinctiveness of 
agency relationships. This essay emphasizes the corporation’s rights of control over its officers 
and mechanisms through which control may be exercised, grounded in the principal’s right of 
control as an essential or constitutive element of an agency relationship.114 Distinctively, 
principals have power to give binding instructions to agents, illustrated in this essay by the 
directives given by boards to senior officers in Gantler and Amalgamated Bank. However, some 
general theories of fiduciary law require that the fiduciary be able to exercise discretionary 
power.115 This is at odds with the basic definition of agency, to which the principal’s right of 
control is essential.116 And, as Gantler and Amalgamated Bank illustrate, it’s not always 
desirable that an officer exercise discretion, a determination to be made by the board of directors, 
not the officer acting unilaterally.  
One potential response, the taxonomic move of expelling agents from the fiduciary 
114See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666. 
115See, e.g., Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 262 
(2011). Although not central to my own scholarship, I mention the fiduciary’s possession of 
discretion as a common characteristic of fiduciary relationships. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond 
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke L. J. 879, 908. Many years on, I’ve 
come to appreciate that this is inconsistent with agency law, including for my account of the 
significance of an agent’s interpretation of instructions furnished by the principal. DeMott, 
Fiduciary Character, supra note 39. 
116See Julian Velasco, Delimiting Fiduciary Status (ms at 11) in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON FIDUCIARY LAW (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold, eds. forthcoming 2017); Alice 
Woolley, The Lawyer as Fiduciary: Defining Private Law Duties in Public Law Relations, 65 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 285, 309-15 (2015). 
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family, runs counter to long-established law. It also ignores the fact, as Julian Velasco observes, 
that “[a]gency bears the most important hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship: the principal 
entrusts the agent with power, and becomes vulnerable as a result.”117 Or one might stretch 
“discretion,” or eliminate the requirement of discretion from the general definition of 
fiduciary.118 Regardless of the misfit between theoretical accounts of fiduciary law and agency, 
corporate officers illustrate the stakes associated with treating agents as fiduciaries, even when 
the principal has not conferred discretion. A corporation is vulnerable to its officers’ exercise of 
power, which is conferred by the principal, and the corporation’s attempt to limit its vulnerability 
through tightly-defined directives should not undercut its fiduciary relationship with its officers. 
Nor should it enable officers to obtain material benefits through the exercise of delegated power    
without the principal’s informed consent.119 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 The scholarship of Lyman Johnson and David Millon is extensive as well as multi-
                                                 
117Velasco, supra note 116, at (ms. 12).  
118Id. at 12-13; see also Arthur Laby, Book Review, 35 Law & Phil. 123, 132 
(2016)(reviewing PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. 
Miller eds. (2014))(characterizing as “too reductionist” approach that casts discretionary 
authority as a necessary condition for a fiduciary relationships). 
 
119For example, if a board of directors instructs the corporation’s treasurer to execute a 
particular transaction on particular terms, the treasurer is not free to front-run the transaction just 
because the instruction conferred no discretion. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 
(agent’s duty not to acquire a material benefit from  third party in connection with actions taken 
on behalf of the principal). Front-running may also constitute a crime. See Christopher M. 
Matthews, HSBC Executive Arrested in U.S., WALL ST. J., July 21, 2016 at C1 (two top bank 
executives, learning that client had engaged bank to execute $3.5 billion currency exchange, 
front-ran order, netted millions for bank and for themselves by stockpiling millions of pounds, 
driving up price of pound, prior to execution of exchange of client’s dollars for pounds). 
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faceted. Additionally, the line of work celebrated in this essay was prescient in recasting the 
account of corporate officers into terms centered on officers’ status as agents. As Lyman and 
David demonstrated, understanding how the law treats officers’ positions and duties requires 
acknowledging that officers are agents. Their scholarship continues to furnish an analytic and 
normative framework for assessing subsequent developments, a hallmark of enduring influence. 
